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Abstract Hillel Steiner has recently attacked the notion of inalienable rights,
basing some of his arguments on the Hohfeldian analysis to show that infinite arrays
of legal positions would not be associated with any inalienable rights. This essay
addresses the nature of the Hohfeldian infinity: the main argument is that what
Steiner claims to be an infinite regress is actually a wholly unproblematic form of
infinite recursion. First, the nature of the Hohfeldian recursion is demonstrated. It is
shown that infinite recursions of legal positions ensue regardless of whether
inalienable rights exist or not. Second, the alleged problems that this might pose for
the analysis are discussed. The conclusion is that one should not worry about the
recursion as long as one understands correctly the role of the Hohfeldian analysis in
normative reasoning.
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Preliminaries
Hillel Steiner has in a recent article attacked the notion of inalienable rights (Steiner
2013). He does not only employ substantive moral arguments for this purpose, but
also arguments that rely directly on the system of analysis developed by Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld. The Hohfeldian scheme can, according to Steiner, be used to
show that inalienable rights lead either to logical contradictions or to infinite arrays
of legal positions, and this can only be avoided by conceding that all rights are
alienable. So runs Steiner’s argument.
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A closely similar argument made by Steiner in An Essay on Rights (Steiner 1994)
two decades ago was refuted by Nigel Simmonds (1995).1 Simmonds’s article alone
is sufficient for understanding where the problem in Steiner’s argument lies. A reply
to Steiner’s more recent essay has been published in Ethics by Pierfrancesco
Biasetti, who also discusses the issue further in a related article (Biasetti 2015a, b).
Though Steiner’s argument is based on a misguided application of Hohfeld, he
raises an interesting question about the infinities that are present in the Hohfeldian
system. Biasetti concedes Steiner’s point to a certain extent, arguing that the
Hohfeldian analysis needs to be modified in order to amend a more general problem
that does not pertain to inalienable rights. This is due to a particular feature of the
Hohfeldian analysis: any Hohfeldian system contains an infinite number of legal
positions. Although Biasetti is correct in that the ‘nonclosure’ of normative
positions is an intrinsic feature of the Hohfeldian system—rather than pertaining to
the inalienability of rights, as Steiner claims—I disagree with both over whether this
is actually a problem.
The Hohfeldian Analysis
The Hohfeldian analysis was devised by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, an American
legal scholar. He wished to expose how jurists used legal terms, such as the word
‘right’, ambiguously, and how this led to faulty reasoning. Though Hohfeld was a
jurist, his framework is equally suitable for the analysis of moral and other
normative systems. In the Hohfeldian analysis, normative relations are reduced to
eight basic positions, four of which are typically called first-order positions and the
other four higher-order positions. It can roughly be said that the first-order positions
pertain to whether a given type of action is required, permitted or forbidden in
relation to a given party,2 whereas higher-order positions concern how normative
relations can be changed, and thus relate only indirectly to the permissibility or
obligatoriness of physical conduct.
The first-order positions are duty, liberty, claim and no-right. One’s having the
duty to u means that u-ing—which can be any type of conduct—is obligatory. It
also entails that at least one party has a claim (also known as claim-right) to this
conduct.3 A Hohfeldian duty is thus always held toward someone. For instance, if I
have the duty to pay you £500, then you have the claim-right that I pay you £500.
These two positions are correlatives: a duty entails at least one claim-right (Fig. 1).4
Similarly, liberty and no-right are correlatives. A’s having a liberty to refrain from
1 These essays are the earliest discussions of which I am aware where the nature of the Hohfeldian
recursion has implications for a substantive normative issue. The issue has been addressed in some other
writings, but usually very tangentially.
2 For a discussion of the relational nature of Hohfeldian first-order positions, see Van Duffel (2012).
3 This is the so-called correlativity axiom of the Hohfeldian system, according to which duties are always
accompanied by claims, and vice versa. This axiom is sometimes questioned. I will not address this
discussion in this paper. See Kramer (1998, p. 22).
4 Hohfeld himself would actually have said that a duty always correlates with exactly one claim-right.
Here, I am employing Kramer’s modification of Hohfeld, according to which a single duty can correlate
with multiple claim-rights. This does not affect my argument.
138 V. A. J. Kurki
123
u-ing towards B means that A is not duty-bound toward B to u. Such a liberty is
entailed by a no-right, that is, lack of claim. Thus, B holds a no-right in relation to A
with regard to A’s u-ing.
There are four higher-order positions: power, disability, liability and immunity.
Power means that one can change a legal relation through a volitional act, whereas
disability logically means the lack thereof. Similarly, B’s having a liability towards
A means that A can change a legal relation that pertains to B, and immunity implies
the absence of such a relation.
The Hohfeldian table does not yet tell us how the concept of ‘right’ should be
defined, and there is considerable disagreement in this regard. According to Steiner,
Hohfeldian claims and immunities are rights, as they entail constraints for the
correlative duty-bearers and disability-holders, respectively.5 I will here use the
term ‘right’ interchangeably with ‘claim’, as the argument I am addressing focuses
on the inalienability of claims.
The Hohfeldian framework does not make many normative claims about moral or
legal relations, perhaps none at all. It does presuppose certain things, such as the
correlativity of claim-rights and duties (the so-called correlativity axiom6), but in
general the framework is neutral when it comes to evaluative assertions about the
content of morality or of a legal system or of another type of normative system.
Steiner believes, however, that the Hohfeldian system can be used to show that no
rights can be inalienable. His argument is dependent on a particular feature of the
Hohfeldian system: that higher-order positions, such as powers and liabilities, can
also pertain to other higher-order positions. For instance, if a traffic police officer
has the power P1 to impose an obligation O for a driver to stop his or her car, but the
police commissioner may fire the officer, then the police commissioner has the
power P2 to extinguish the power P1 of the officer. In this case, P1 pertains directly
to O, whereas P2 pertains to P1. There is an infinite number of such higher-order
5 Steiner (2013, p. 233f) addresses the question of how rights should be identified among the Hohfeldian
positions.
6 See note 3.
A’s duty towards B to φ
(A’s duty to pay £500 to B) implies
B’s claim or claim-right that A φ
(B’s claim-right that A pay B £500) 
is the opposite (or 
contradictory) of  
is the opposite (or contradictory) of
A’s liberty towards B not to φ
(A’s liberty not to pay £500 to B)
implies
B’s no-right concerning A’s not φ-ing
(B’s no-right concerning A’s not paying 
B £500) 
Fig. 1 For every regulated action, omission or conduct, A has either a duty or a liberty, and B has either
a claim-right or a no-right
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relations—for instance, the mayor could have the power P3 to fire the police
commissioner and thus extinguish P2—even though at some point the relations most
likely become disability-immunity relations. This is the recursion (which Steiner
calls the ‘regression’) of higher-order Hohfeldian relations. I will analyse the nature
of the Hohfeldian recursion more closely in the third section. I will, however, first
present the structure of Steiner’s argument.
Steiner’s Argument
Steiner begins by describing a situation between two parties, Blue and Red, where
Red is under the duty not to assault Blue, and Blue holds the correlative claim (that
is, right) against Red’s assaulting her. In addition, Blue does not have the power to
waive this duty by consenting to the assault, but holds rather the corresponding
disability D1. Blue seems to be the holder of an inalienable right. However, Steiner
claims that this is not the case:
[Blue’s right is not inalienable] for disabilities entail correlative immunities.
So, if Blue is encumbered with D1, then someone else, say Green, is vested
with the correlative immunity, I1, against Blue’s waiving Red’s duty not to
assault Blue. Now, the question we have to ask is this: Is Green’s immunity, I1,
waivable and, if so, by whom? If it is waivable and, moreover, waivable by
Green, then Green is in a position to extinguish D1: that is, to release Blue
from her disability to waive Red’s duty not to assault her. And if Blue can be
thus empowered to waive that duty, then, trivially, that duty is a waivable one,
that is, its correlative right is alienable. (Steiner 2013)
I should note that there is a mistake in the passage above; Green does not have an
immunity that correlates with D1. The immunity-holders here are Blue and Red
themselves. Green does, however, hold a disability D2 to change Blue’s disability
D1. This mistake will pose some problems for Steiner’s main argument, a matter to
which I will return in ‘Coping with the Infinity’. Steiner then goes on to describe
how Black may have a disability D3 to change Green’s disability D2, and Purple
may have a disability D4 pertaining to D3, and so on. He concludes as follows:
[T]he sufficiently unmistakable point here is that wherever this otherwise
infinite regress stops, it can be stopped only by an immunity which is waivable
by the person vested with it. And the exercise of that waiver renders serially
possible a succession of waivers—a waiver chain—that terminates in Blue’s
being empowered to waive Red’s nonassault duty. And the waivability of that
duty entails, once again, that Blue’s right against Red’s assaulting her is not
inalienable. (Steiner 2013)
Steiner claims that we are faced with two choices: either we accept that all rights
are waivable or we accept the infinite recursion which he calls nonclosure. The
problem with nonclosure is, according to Steiner, that there is ‘necessarily
insufficient time and/or persons’ to sustain such a normative system, as we could not
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warrantedly assert whether a right has been waived without first investigating the
endless chain of powers and/or disabilities (Steiner 2013).
Infinite Recursion of Higher-Order Relations
An important difference between the concepts of recursion and regress is that
whereas with recursion we know what A is and then use it to define B, in the case of
regress we do not know what A is and need B to define A. The regress becomes
infinite if we also need C to define B, and so on, infinitely. Infinite regress is
characteristically problematic, as it never manages to establish A (or B, or C…),
whereas infinite recursion does not suffer from such problems. The sequentiality
that the Hohfeldian system exhibits is clearly a case of recursion, for the definition
of claims and duties is not dependent on any higher-order positions, and higher-
order positions are defined in relation to lower-order positions. This is essentially
why the Hohfeldian infinity is not problematic, either: it is built on solid ground.
Every Hohfeldian recursion begins from a deontic relation between two
Hohfeldian parties. This relation consists of a duty and a claim-right or a liberty
and a no-right with regard to a particular action. For the purposes of this article, I
will call such a relation a base relation.7 In addition, the N-order relation contains
some N - 1-order parties as N-order liability-holders or immunity-bearers, and at
least some of those individuals are also N - 2-order parties, except where N = 2.
Thus, both the Hohfeldian N-level relations and the Fibonaccian N-level numbers
are defined by reference to the relations or numbers at the N - 1 and N - 2 levels,
except where N = 1 or N = 2.8
For example, if Red has a duty not to assault Blue (N = 1), and Green has a
disability to alter this relation (N = 2), but the Legislator has a power to alter
Green’s disability (N = 3), then the Legislator’s power pertains necessarily both to
Green’s disability towards Red and Blue, and to Red and Blue’s immunities towards
Green. Therefore this third-order power concerns both second-order and first-order
parties, even if these individuals are of course comprised in the third-order relation
itself as third-order parties, that is, as third-order liability-bearers.9 It is also
7 It is of course the case that one’s exercise of one’s power is either permitted, required or forbidden (or
both required and forbidden). For instance, a judge has not only the power but also the duty to sentence
the accused in accordance with the law. However, the judge’s duty to exercise this power is a completely
new base relation, with new ensuing recursion: everyone either has the power or the disability to change
the judge’s duty, and so on. Duty-claim and liberty-no-right relations are always base relations.
8 I have chosen to represent Hohfeldian higher-order relations as one relation that pertains to three
parties: the power-holder and the two liability-bearers. At least two of these parties can be the same
individual, for example if one holds a power to change one’s own entitlement. I prefer this way of
presentation because every Hohfeldian power or disability always involves the ability or lack of ability to
alter two positions. It could also be understood as two separate relations that can only be altered
simultaneously.
9 The first-order parties (Red and Blue) are encompassed by the power of the Legislator due to their
involvement in the second-order relation. This does not change the fact that the first-order parties and the
second-order passive parties (that is, holders of liabilities and/or immunities) must be the same
individuals, which is why the passive parties of the third-order relation must include the individuals who
are first-order parties.
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interesting to note that higher-order positions pertaining to any lower-level relation
are always held by every Hohfeldian subject, which is why the number of relations
grows exponentially except in the trivial case where there is only one Hohfeldian
subject. I exemplify this in Fig. 2.
In the diagram, there exist only three Hohfeldian subjects: Red, Green and Blue.
We can see that there are thus 3 s-order relations and 32 = 9 third-order relations—
the number of relations (represented by arrows) grows exponentially. In accordance
with my way of counting, at a given order the number of relations that pertain to a
given base relation is Pn-1, where P is the number of existing Hohfeldian subjects—
that is, entities encompassed in Hohfeldian relations—and n is the order in question.
The number of Hohfeldian relations pertaining to a given base relation that exist
altogether at n-order and all the orders under it (the so-called partial sum) can be
calculated using summation:
Xn
i¼1
Pi1
  ¼ P0 þ P1 þ P2 þ P3 þ    þ Pn1 P 2 N0
Summation can also show us conclusively the infinite number of Hohfeldian
relations that pertain to a given base relation, even where there is only one
Fig. 2 The recursion of Hohfeldian higher-order entitlements, exemplified up until third order
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Hohfeldian subject.10 The infinite series below does not have a sum, as it tends to
infinity, as long as P = 0 (meaning that there must be at least one Hohfeldian
subject; otherwise there are no Hohfeldian relations at all).
X1
i¼1
Pi1
  ¼ P0 þ P1 þ P2 þ P3 þ    P 2 N0
Due to the exponential nature of the recursion, I am not certain that the metaphor
of a spiral that is used by Simmonds (1995) is the most suitable way of describing
this phenomenon; it resembles rather a tree, which is why I will henceforth refer to
any series of recursive higher-order modalities that pertain to a given base relation
as a recursive tree.
Now that we have specified what the Hohfeldian infinite recursion is all about,
we may address Steiner’s arguments.
Coping with the Infinity
Steiner identifies two problems with the Hohfeldian infinite recursion: firstly, it
renders the ascertainment of any inalienable right impossible, for there is a never-
ending chain of potential powers-to-waive that need to be verified before one can
say with certainty that such a right actually exists; secondly, Steiner claims that the
infinity entails a contradiction. I will first assess the second claim:
The oddity of this infinite regression essentially derives from the fact that it
entails a contradiction. Thus, (1) it is necessarily true—true by definition—
that each disability entails one and only one corresponding immunity; (2)
therefore it is necessarily true that the number of disabilities is equal to the
number of immunities; (3) but in the case of Blue’s allegedly inalienable right,
the number of immunities is one less than the number of disabilities, because
(a) Blue is a disability-holder, but not an immunity-holder, and (b) all
immunity-holders are (allegedly) also disability-holders. (Steiner 2013)
As I have already noted in the ‘Steiner’s Argument’ section, this putative
contradiction is simply a misapplication of Hohfeld at (3a). Blue is indeed an
immunity-holder; in the case of an inalienable claim, Blue holds this immunity M
towards himself in the second order, and an immunity-that-M-be-altered towards
every Hohfeldian subject in the third order, and so on.11 Fig. 2 may bring clarity to
why the situation Steiner describes is impossible. Green cannot have an immunity
10 I am assuming here that one can be in a Hohfeldian deontic relation with oneself. This is certainly not
logically contradictory, even if it can of course be argued that deontic relations can only exist in a
community of individuals.
11 Steiner’s claim that Blue is not an immunity-holder here might stem from the fact that he seems to
think that one cannot hold a disability or a power toward oneself, as he points out elsewhere in the article:
‘[W]e need to ask the Hohfeldian question of who holds the immunity correlatively entailed by the
disability which this inalienability is. We know that it cannot be the rights-holder him- or herself, since
correlativity is a relation obtaining between two different persons: one cannot have rights against oneself’
(Steiner 2013, p. 243). However, it is relatively obvious that one can hold powers toward oneself;
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against Blue’s waiving Red’s duty not to assault Blue. In every higher-order
relation, there are always three parties—one ‘active’ party (with a power or a
disability) and two ‘passive’ parties12 (with liabilities or immunities)—and the
passive parties of an N-level relation must be the same as in the N - 1-level
relation that the N-level relation pertains to.13 In the case of second-order relations,
the passive parties must always be the same individuals as the parties in the base
relation. As Green is an ‘outsider’ with regard to Red’s duty toward Blue, Green
cannot have an immunity in the second order (even though he must have either a
second-order power or disability). So there is no contradiction.
What about Steiner’s claim—accepted by Biasetti—that there is necessarily
insufficient time to sustain normative systems with infinite recursion? We should
firstly note that the Hohfeldian infinite recursion obtains completely, regardless of
whether a power-to-waive exists at some point in the tree or not. Except perhaps
in very odd normative systems, in any Hohfeldian recursive tree there is always
a limited number of powers and an infinite number of disabilities. This fact is
wholly independent of the inalienability of rights. Steiner is of course right, to an
extent, when stating that ‘endorsers of the belief that there can be inalienable
rights […] must either reject the Hohfeldian logic of correlative relations
embedded in rights discourse or embrace infinite regressiveness—nonclosure—in
the sets of rules constituting that domain’ (Steiner 2013, pp. 238–239). This is
true insofar as ‘regressiveness’ is understood correctly as ‘recursion’. But this
does not only concern those who assert that inalienable rights exist: both the
proponents and opponents of the notion of inalienable rights who hope to use the
Hohfeldian system must accept the infinity embedded in it.14 However, should
we be worried about this feature of the system? Steiner thinks so, as does
Biasetti, who writes:
Problems arise […] with the ‘vertical’ infinity entailed by the nonclosure of the
secondary rules made up of [higher-order positions]. Things get unmanageable
with this kind of infinity because it is impossible to determine definitively who is
in charge of changing the normative positions. (Biasetti 2015a)
We should firstly note that as we are talking about recursion and not regression,
the existence of claims and other first-order positions can easily be established in the
Hohfeldian framework. However, what worries Steiner and Biasetti is not the
existence of claims but rather the ascertainment of whether such claims are
inalienable. According to this line of argument, claims cannot be inalienable,
Footnote 11 continued
otherwise one would be wholly incapable of altering one’s own normative position. It would therefore be
odd to argue that one can hold powers toward oneself but not their opposites, disabilities.
12 Using my method of counting the relations, there is one power or disability and two liabilities or
immunities. There can just as well be two powers or disabilities; this is simply a matter of bookkeeping.
13 One should bear in mind that the Hohfeldian subject who is the active party can also be (but need not
be) either of the passive parties; one may occupy several positions in a single Hohfeldian relation.
14 Biasetti notes this, too: ‘It would seem, therefore, that nonclosure is not an exclusive byproduct of
inalienable rights: the Hohfeldian framework is itself nonclosed and naturally entails an infinite number
of elements’ (Biasetti 2015a, p. 148).
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because that would assume a non-closed system, and if we had such a system we
would not be able to ascertain the existence of a claim-right. Biasetti even sets out to
propose different amendments to the Hohfeldian system to rectify this issue.
(Biasetti 2015a, b). These amendments may very well lead to an improved system
overall; I cannot address them here. However, the fact that there may be better
systems for analysing normative relations does not imply that the Hohfeldian system
would be fundamentally defective in any way. In fact, I do not see the Hohfeldian
infinite recursion as a problem at all.
Steiner and Biasetti’s way of looking at the matter asserts the primacy of the
Hohfeldian system over moral and legal rules and principles. We ought to bear in
mind, however, that the Hohfeldian system is merely a tool for modelling rules and
principles on the level of individuals. These norms can be formulated in ways that
settle the question of how many powers can be found in the higher orders of a
recursive tree. Let us take the example of an imaginary constitutional amendment:
1. No human beings that reside in the territory of this country may torture any
other human beings that reside in the territory of this country.
2. The duty prescribed in (1) is nonwaivable.
3. This amendment, including this provision, cannot be repealed.
For any two human beings that reside in the territory of the country in question—
let us call them H1 and H2—the statute leads to at least the following Hohfeldian
positions:
• H1 is under the duty D to refrain from torturing H2, and H2 has the
corresponding claim-right C toward H1 (and vice versa, but I will disregard that
here).
• Every Hohfeldian subject (including H2) has a disability toward H1 and H2 to
extinguish D and R.
• There is an infinite number of disabilities in this recursive tree.
The infinite recursion can therefore easily be formulated as rules using quantifiers
such as ‘no one else’, ‘only’ and so on. When such quantifiers are used explicitly or
implicitly, there is no need to go through an infinite number of higher-order
modalities to ascertain that a right is inalienable. The very meaning of the
proposition ‘Right R is inalienable’ implies that powers-to-waive do not exist in the
recursive tree in question. (Formally, this can be expressed using first-order
predicate logic.)
Steiner proposes that the Hohfeldian ‘nonclosure’ could be resolved if we reject
the existence of inalienable rights. This attempt is, however, not successful. Biasetti,
on the other hand, correctly identifies infinite recursion as a necessary feature of any
Hohfeldian system, but is needlessly troubled about this. As long as the role of the
Hohfeldian analysis in normative reasoning is understood correctly, the infinite
recursion of higher-order positions is nothing to worry about.
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